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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Case No. 920186-CA

Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

Priority No. 3

STEVEN MICHAEL STILLING,
Defendant/Appellant«
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

The

following

points

are

submitted

by Appellant

Steven

Stilling ("Stilling")in reply to the arguments presented in the
State7s responsive brief.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE UTAH SUPREME COURTS RECENT DECISION IN WTT.T.TgTT y, BARNES
IS DISPOSITIVE OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED BY THIS APPEAL.
The fundamental issue presented by this appeal is whether the

trial court substantially complied with Rule 11 of the Utah Rules
of Criminal Procedure ("Rule 11") and other applicable law in
accepting the guilty pleas of Stilling.1

On October 28, 1992, the

Utah Supreme Court issued an opinion which directly addresses the
issue of what is required of the trial court in accepting a guilty
plea.

Willett v. Barnes, 199 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (1992).

The trial

court's actions in this case fail to comply with Willett.

1

Stilling entered his pleas of guilty pursuant to North
Carolina v. Alford. 400 U.S. 25 (1970), which allowed Stilling to
maintain his innocence while pleading guilty in order to accept a
favorable plea bargain.

In Willett, the appellant sought to withdraw his plea of
guilty to a charge of first degree murder on the grounds that,
among other things, the trial court failed to establish a factual
basis for the plea.

Id.

Addressing the appellant's claim, the

Supreme Court stated:
This court's decision in State v. Breckenridae. 688
P.2d P. 2d 440 (Utah 1983), established that before
accepting a guilty plea, a trial court must develop a
factual basis upon which to base a conviction of the
charged crime. In Breckenridae, we concluded that even
though the plea colloquy did include a recitation of
surrounding facts, as a matter of law those facts were
insufficient to support the charge. Id. at 442-44. In
this case, the colloquy contains no recitation of any
facts surrounding the death of the victim. We therefore
conclude that the plea colloquy failed to develop the
factual basis necessary for the court to properly accept
Willett's plea.
On appeal, the State contends, however, as the
district court concluded, that the "record as a whole"
established a sufficient factual basis to accept the
guilty plea, even if the plea hearing did not. Willett#s
plea occurred before our decision in State* v. Gibbons,
740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987), and the ore-Gibbons rule
required reviewing courts to uphold guilty pleas as long
as the record as a whole demonstrated "substantial
compliance"
with
constitutional
and
procedural
requirements.
State v. Hoff. 814 P.2d 1119, 1123-24
(Utah 1991).
Applying the substantial compliance test, we
conclude the court below erred. In the entire* record,
nothing supports a finding that an adequate* factual basis
existed at the time Willett entered his plea. The State
has not adverted to any facts regarding the events
themselves that could form the basis of a conviction.
The closest cinything in the record comes to establishing
a factual basis is a brief colloquy, prompted by Mr.
Watson, a deputy county attorney, during the entry of
Harley Willett's guilty plea on the second degree murder
charge:
MR WATSON: Perhaps the court would want to inquire
whether or not there is a factual basis from this
particular defendant with regard to the entry of
this plea Your Honor.
2

THE COURT: Suppose you state for the court briefly
Mr. Willett how exactly it happened on the 20th of
November?
MR. HARLEY WILLETT:
father.
THE COURT:

In doing what?

MR. HARLEY WILLETT:
Mr. Dan Okleberry.
THE COURT:

Well, I aided and abetted my

In the commission of killing

I suppose that is adequate Mr. Watson.

The court then accepted Harley Willett#s plea.
Yet
Harley Willett's statement of "how exactly it happened"
is merely a legal conclusion, parroting the statutory
elements of the crime charged against him. Whether or
not it established an adequate factual basis for Harley
Willett's plea, it certainly did not validate the guilty
plea that Duane Willett has already entered. We thus
reverse the district court's conclusion"[t]hat a factual
basis for the charge made against the defendant is
evident from the record, even though not succinctly
stated by or to the Court." [Emphasis added].
The district court also upheld the validity of Duane
Willett's plea on a finding "[t]hat although he knew in
his own mind that he was not guilty . . . , he wanted to
save his son from any jeopardy to the death penalty." To
the extent the court treated this finding as a sufficient
factual basis to uphold the plea as intelligently and
voluntarily made, it misread Breckenridge.
In
Breckenridae. we suggested that a valid guilty plea
required a "record of facts" showing either "that the
charged crime was actually committed by the defendant, or
that the defendant has for some other legitimate reason
intelligently and voluntarily entered such a plea." 688
P.2d at 440. But by "record of facts" showing some other
legitimate reason for the plea, we meant facts that would
substantiate the prosecution of the charge at trial, not
merely facts establishing the defendant's motivation for
entering the plea.
Breckenridae cited North Carolina v. Alfordr 400
U.S. 25 (1970), as an example of other legitimate reasons
for pleading guilty. In Alford, the defendant maintained
his innocence yet pleaded guilty because he acknowledged
the strength of the state's case against him and because
by pleading guilty, he avoided risking the death penalty.
Id. at 27-29.
In denying Willett's petitions, the
district court below similarly concluded that Willett
3

believed he had a legitimate reason to plead guilty
because he desired to spare his son the risk of the death
penalty and he therefore entered his pleei intelligently
and voluntarily. But in Alford, the record before the
trial court documented facts establishing the strength of
the state's case, facts that would have placed the
defendant at a serious risk of conviction had he
proceeded to trial. Id. Critically, in Willett's case
the record reveals no facts that would support the
prosecution of the charge or suggest that either Duane
Willett or Harley Willett faced a substantial risk of
conviction at trial. A court cannot be satisfied that a
guilty plea is knowing and voluntary unless the record
establishes facts that would place the defendamt at risk
of conviction should the matter proceed to trial.
Therefore, Alford is inapposite, and the factual basis
requirement of Breckenridae remains unsatisfied.
Id. at 3-4.
As in Willett, nothing in the record at the time Stilling
entered his pleas provides a sufficient factual basis for the trial
court's acceptance of his pleas.

As the State recognizes in its

brief, the only part of the record that provided any factual basis
for the pleas was the expiation agreement (a copy of which is
attached to the State's brief as appendix 4).
at pp. 19-25.

See, State's Brief

As even the most cursory review of the expiation

agreement reveals, the expiation agreement fails to set forth any
facts that would support the prosecution of the charges against
Stilling or suggest that Stilling faced a substantial risk of
conviction at trial.

Accordingly, as recognized in Willett, the

original trial court could not be satisfied that Stilling's guilty
pleas were knowing and voluntary and the second trial court erred
in denying Stilling's motion to withdraw his pleas, after having
found that the record in 1985 involving the taking of the guilty
pleas was not in substantial compliance with Rule 11. R. 159.
4

II. THE COURT SHOULD RESPECT THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING OP LACK OF
SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 11.
In its Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law denying
Stilling's motion to withdraw his pleas (attached to Stilling's
opening brief as addendum C) / the trial court specifically found as
follows:
If the court were to rely only on the record as it
existed at the time of the pleas# that record would be
insufficient to establish substantial compliance with
Utah R. Crim. P. 11.
R. 159.
The State now attempts to categorize this critical finding by
the trial court as a "subsidiary ruling" and, despite have failed
to appeal the trial court's ruling, asks the Court to declare that
it was error. State's Brief at p. 15. The Court should not do so.
If the State did not agree with the trial court's ruling, it
should have filed a cross-appeal. The State argues that because it
got the outcome it wanted, it was "disinclined to appeal any error
made en route to the ultimate outcome." State's Brief at p. 15. n.
4.

This argument would have been valid had Stilling not appealed

the trial court's decision.

Stilling, however, filed a timely

appeal of the trial court's ruling.

Thus, the entire matter was

put before the Court and any disinclination on the State's part to
appeal a "subsidiary ruling" was removed.

If the State believed

that the trial court had erred in finding a lack of "substantial
compliance" at the time of taking the pleas, it should have filed
a notice of cross-appeal within fourteen (14) days of Stilling's
notice of appeal.

Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4.
5

Having

failed to do so, the State is forever barred from having the trial
court's finding reviewed by this or any other court.
Should the Court choose to give consideration to the State's
improper appeal of the trial court's lack of substantial compliance
ruling, it must find that trial court's ruling was correct.

As

discussed more fully above, the Supreme Court's decision in Willett
requires that at the time Stilling's pleas were accepted by the
original trial court. the record contain facts that would support
the prosecution of the charges or suggest that Stilling faced a
substantial risk of conviction at trial.
Rep. at 3-4.

Willett, 199 Utah Adv.

As recognized by the trial court and as all but

conceded by the State, the record at the time Stilling entered his
pleas did not contain such facts.

Thus, the trial court's so-

called "subsidiary ruling11 was not error.

Rather, it was a well

founded recognition of the law.

III.

THE AFFIDAVIT OF STILLING'S FORMER COUNSEL SHOULD NOT HAVE
BEEN CONSIDERED BY THE TRIAL COURT.
Although the Court can decide this case on Willett alone, it

could give guidance to the trial court by addressing the propriety
or legality of the affidavit of Stilling's former counsel which was
submitted by the State over six years after the pleas were entered.
That affidavit was the sole ground upon which the trial court
denied Stilling's motion to withdraw his pleas and is the only
entry in any of the records that could provide even the slightest
compliance with Rule 11. This affidavit, however, is a violation

6

of the most inviolable of privileges and should never have found
its way into any record.
The law has long recognized the absolute need for an attorneyclient privilege.
The purpose of the privilege is to encourage clients to
make full disclosure to their attorneys. . . [I]f the
client knows that damaging information could more readily
be obtained from the attorney following disclosure them
from himself in the absence of disclosure, the client
would be reluctant to confide in his lawyer and it would
be difficult to obtain fully informed legal advice.
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 401 (1976).
"The privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy
depends upon the lawyer being fully informed by the client."
Upiohn Company v. United States. 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
In Utah, the legislature recognized the sanctity of the
privilege when it enacted Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-8 which provides
in pertinent part:
There are particular relations in which it is the
policy of the law to encourage confidence and to preserve
it inviolate. Therefore, a person cannot be examined as
a witness in the following cases:

(2) An attorney cannot, without the consent of his
client, be examined as to any communication made by his
client to him, or his advice given therein, in the course
of professional employment; nor can an attorney's
secretary, stenographer or clerk be examined, without the
consent of his employer, concerning any fact, the
knowledge of which has been acquired in such capacity.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-51-26(5) further provides that it is the duty
and

obligation

of

an

attorney

to

"maintain

inviolate

the

confidences, and at every peril to himself to pursue the secrets of
his client."

Finally, Utah Rule of Evidence 504 provides that:
7

A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to
prevent any other person from disclosing confidential
communications made for the purpose of facilitating the
rendition of professional legal services to the client
between the client and the client's representatives,
lawyers,
lawyer's
representatives,
and
lawyers
representing others in matters of common interest • . .
The State, the trial court, and, most egregiously, Stilling#s
former attorney all ignored Stilling's privilege to keep secret
discussions between he and his former counsel and acted to violate
Rules 1.62 and 1.93 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct*
2

Rule 1.6 provides:

(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating
to representation of a client except as stated in
paragraph (b), unless the client consents after
disclosure.
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the
extent the lawyer believes necessary:
(1) To prevent the client from committing a
crimincil or fraudulent act that the lawyer believes
is lik€ily to result in death of substantial bodily
harm, or substantial injury to the financial
interest or property of another;
(2) To rectify the consequences of a client's
criminal or fraudulent act in the commission of
which the lawyer's services had been used;
(3) To establish a claim or defense on behalf
of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer
and the client or to establish a defense to a
criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer
based upon conduct in which the client was
involved; or
(4) To comply with the Rules of Professional
Conduct or other law.
3

Rule 1.9 provides:

A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a
matter shall not thereafter:
8

The

affidavit

of

Stilling#s

former

counsel

describes

discussions which occurred between Stilling and him concerning the
alleged crimes as well the legal strategy pursued in defending
Stilling.

It is exactly this type of communication which the

privilege seeks to protect.

See, Utah Rule of Evidence 504.

Stilling had and continues to have the right to prevent such
communications
counsel's

from being disclosed and, as such, his former

affidavit

should

never

have

been

submitted

to or

considered by the trial court.
In an attempt

to support the obvious violation

of the

attorney-client privilege, the State advances the argument that
Stilling has claimed ineffectiveness of counsel and, in so doing,
has waived the privilege.

This argument is wholly unfounded.

Stilling never intended to assert any claim of ineffectiveness of
counsel and, as recognized by the State, Stilling's counsel made
this point clear in the trial court.4

State's Brief at pp. 31-32.

The only matter before the trial court was Stilling's motion to
withdraw his guilty pleas based upon a lack of

substantial

(a) Represent another person in the same or a
substantially factually related matter in which
that person's interests are materially adverse to
the interests of the former client consents after
consultation; or
(b) Use
information
relating
to
the
representation to the disadvantage of the former
client except as Rule 1.6 would permit with respect
to a client or when the information has become
generally known.
4

In so stating, Stilling specifically reserves any claims he
may have against his former attorney based on that attorney's
blatant violation of the attorney-client privilege.
9

compliance with Rule 11. Accordingly, the State's reliance on Utah
Rule of Evidence 504(d) and Utah Rule of Professional Conduct
1.6(b)(3) is clearly misplaced.

The language of these exceptions

makes it clear that they only apply to disputes regarding the
quality or nature of an attorney's representation of a client.
They are of no matter where there is only a dispute as to the trial
court's compliance with the law.
Inasmuch as the affidavit served as the sole basis for the
trial court's denial of Stilling's motion, the trial court's ruling
was clearly in €*rror and must be reversed by the Court.

CONCLUSION
The original trial court failed to even substeintially comply
with Rule 11 when it accepted Stilling's guilty pleas. The record
at the time the pleas were accepted contained no facts that
supported the prosecution of the charges or suggested that Stilling
faced a substantial risk of conviction should the matter proceed to
trial.

The only facts in any of the records which would support

acceptance of the guilty pleas are found in the post-plea affidavit
of Stilling's former counsel.

This affidavit undeniably violates

the attorney-client privilege and should never hcive been submitted
to or considered by the trial court. For these reasons, the Court
should reverse the trial court's denial of Stilling's motion to
withdraw his pleas and remand the case for further proceedings upon
Stilling's plea of not guilty to the original charges.

As the

Supreme Court recognized in Willett, "[n]o legitimate interest of
10

the state can be served by the continued incarceration of a man on
the

strength

of

a

guilty

plea

that

does

not

satisfy

requirements of the law."
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 4th day of December, 1992.
HALEY & STOLEBARGER

Jo Ca^l/NfessetySale
Greggory J. Layxon
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the

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 4th day of December, 1992, four
(4) true and correct copies of the foregoing brief were mailed to
R. Paul Van Dam, Utah Attorney General, J. Kevin Murphy, Assistant
Attorney General, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114.
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